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Discussion
Building the Developmental State:
Achieving Economic Growth Through
Co-operative Solutions: A Comment on
Bringing Politics Back In
W.G. HUFF,  G.  DEWIT and C.  OUGHTON
Drawing on the insights of game theory and East Asian experience,
this short note argues the importance of co-operative solutions in
achieving economic development. To realise these, even genuine
developmental states must convince a sceptical private sector of
their commitment to economic development. Because of this,
credibility should be added to the mix of ingredients necessary for
a successful developmental state.
The developmental state, able to promote economic development as in
Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Japan, has generally been seen largely
or even wholly as a matter of political acumen and a competent bureaucracy.
While our comment on a recent article in this Journal [Leftwich, 1995] does
not dispute the importance of these fundamentally political attributes, its
purpose is to draw attention to a hitherto little considered requirement in the
creation of a developmental state.1 We use the insights of game theory to
emphasise the necessity for economic complementarily between state and
private sector (together, civil society) and in this the prime importance of
credibility and reputation building, if even the most politically astute
developmental state is to succeed. In the absence of a command economy
or dominating degree of state capitalism, economic policies sufficiently
credible to elicit private sector investment should be added to the
components identified as important to the developmental state: an
autonomous, technically competent developmental elite and non-
challenging, or even subordinate, civil society.
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The need to achieve economic credibility is essential for a state wishing
politically to become developmental so long as the private sector, after
sizing up state economic policies, has the freedom to decide whether to
invest or not. For example, Campos and Root [1996: 2] describe how in
South Korea and Taiwan ‘the business community was courted to build a
dynamic industrial base’. In essence, the would-be developmental state’s
problem can be illustrated with a simple prisoner’s dilemma.
Few states come to power without espousing the goal of economic
development. Yet most in fact have other priorities. In developing countries
states usually turn out to be ‘soft’ in Myrdal’s [1981] sense of corruptly
serving narrow group interests, or worse, become kleptocratic states like
Mobutu’s Zaire. Let us assume, however, a state meets the criteria of ‘good’
politics: the state is ‘hard’ in the sense of not merely talking the words of
economic development but also having a genuine political commitment to
it and demonstrating this with productive investment. Nevertheless, the
state has no certainty of realising its developmental goal since the
attainment of this objective depends on whether it can convince the private
sector to invest too. In the pay-off matrix of Figure 1, the government and
private sector each have two possible economic strategies, to co-operate in
investment or to defect.
While the government may be committed to a policy of investment co-
operation, that is to say it is developmental, unless the private sector can
clearly perceive state economic policies as developmental, its best strategy
is defection, which implies not investing. If so, the developmental state
becomes unachievable; the state’s best strategy would similarly be
defection. Accordingly, the game’s unique or Nash equilibrium is low
investment and low development (1, 1) –  a no-growth deadlock. Investment
by the private sector does not materialise unless it judges the state’s
economic programme to be credible. Only when this happens can the civil
society co-operate. Modelling such co-operation would imply a multi-stage
game in which the civil society moved in a co-ordinated way, thus
remaining for a sustained period of time at a superior, high growth, high
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FIGURE 1
INVESTMENT COOPERATION OR DEFECTION – A PRISONER’S DILEMMA
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investment equilibrium, illustrated by the outcome of (5, 5) in the pay-off
matrix of Figure 1. A (5, 5) outcome was achieved in East Asia. En route to
it, economic growth, widely shared among the population, legitimised the
state and this ‘reinforced the credibility of the regime, further stimulating
investment and economic expansion’ [Campos and Root, 1996: 2].
Most evidence indicates that a private sector investing its own money
formulates an independent judgement of whether economically, not just
politically, the state is developmental or not and so whether to support it and
invest in productive enterprise. Acting in its own, not national, interests a
private sector which does not regard the state as economically credible
withholds co-operation in the form of investment. Even regimes politically
determined to pursue investment can founder on this rock of economic
credibility and reputation: ‘economic bureaucracies must generate sufficient
confidence in the minds of the always sceptical audience of private
entrepreneurs so that they are willing to bet their capital in ways that will
make expected policy outcomes a reality’ [Evans, 1998: 68].
Because the private sector has no way of knowing for certain whether
the state’s economic strategy is to be believed, typically the intending
developmental state must put in place some independent, external check on
its credibility. We argue that because an economic policy shift towards
export orientation can be seen objectively to succeed (or not), this affords
an independent check on economic competitiveness and so the credibility of
the state and its developmental rhetoric. Bruton [1998: 921] notes of Taiwan
in the 1950s and South Korea in the 1960s that just such a policy shift to
export orientation ‘convinced many observers that the two countries were
reducing distortions, moving toward getting prices right, and – most evident
of all – were exporting’. The demonstrated credibility of economic success
in world markets would help to explain why so many of the states cited as
developmental have also been economically export-oriented. A balanced
growth model featuring an enhancement of agricultural development and so
the size of the domestic market has also been suggested as conferring the
necessary government economic credibility to elicit private sector
investment [Grabowski, 1997]. 
International and domestic economic policies are not, of course,
mutually exclusive: they can reinforce one another, as the experience of
successful developmental states shows, in building an ongoing relationship
with the private sector. From a policy viewpoint Singapore was unusual in
that the private sector with which the government established credibility
and reputation consisted overwhelmingly of foreign multinationals. By the
1990s they accounted for three-quarters of manufactured output and over
four-fifths of Singapore’s direct (that is, made in Singapore) manufactured
exports [Huff, 1995, 1999]. But the importance of credibility was identical.
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Multinationals knew that they ‘could trust Singapore because other MNCs
always said that Singapore lived up to its commitments’. According to the
chairman of DuPont, ‘In other countries things would constantly come
unglued, whereas in Singapore, once they said something, they stuck to it’
[Schein, 1996: 125]. Sound economic policies, an ability to implement them
and the ‘government’s role in winning credibility’ have been judged the
three ‘crucial and general lessons’ of Singapore’s development experience
[Soon and Tan, 1997: 265].
Once the state has successfully achieved its developmental objective and
the economy enters into a new phase of development, it can comfortably
assume the role of a leader [Rodrik, 1992]. Then, the private sector becomes
the follower, merely reacting to the policies of the state. Under these
circumstances, the state can limit its intervention to ‘directive’ policies only
(for example, subsidy programmes), rather than investing itself.
One can imagine how credibility of state economic policies with
accompanying reputation may be gained over successive stages and, as
suggested above, modeled as a game with multiple moves played between
the duopoly of state and private sector [Dixit, 1996; Huff, Dewit and
Oughton, 2001]. The larger point, however, is, given both the state’s
political and economic credibility, the possibility of the superior, high-level
growth equilibrium. In contrast to a view of the economic development
process which sees growth being achieved through the competitive struggle,
this note stresses that study of the developmental state suggests co-
operation as the superior alternative. A state’s mere claims to be
developmental or even its genuine aspirations in this direction are not
sufficient. Co-operation necessary to achieve the developmental state must
grow out of an ability to convince the private sector of the government’s
commitment as well as its power to implement developmental economic
policies.
final revision accepted March 2001
NOTE
1. Leftwich [1995, 1998] offers especially clear and useful statements of the political attributes
of the developmental state. For other literature on the developmental state see Amsden
[1989], Evans [1995], Johnson [1999] and Wade [1990].
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